Language support
The ten language engines, the frameworks they model, and their known limitations.
Ten languages have their own parser and data-flow engine. The number of rules each reports comes straight from the engine registry; the coverage matrix lists them.
| Language | Files | Data-flow rules | Frameworks modelled |
|---|---|---|---|
| TypeScript / JavaScript Cross-file flows through functions, classes & services | .ts .tsx .js | 19 | Express, NestJS, Next.js, browser DOM |
| Python Cross-module flows through functions & service classes | .py | 22 | Flask, FastAPI, Django |
| Java Spring services across files, entry-point aware | .java | 24 | Servlet, Spring, JAX-RS |
| Kotlin Spring, Ktor, Servlet & Android; shares cross-file evidence with Java | .kt .kts | 23 | Spring, Ktor, Android |
| Go Cross-package calls, path-sensitive, BOLA dominance | .go | 27 | net/http, Gin, Echo, Fiber |
| C# Services across files, path-sensitive, BOLA dominance | .cs | 21 | ASP.NET Core, System.Web (HttpRequest) |
| PHP Functions & classes across includes, path-sensitive | .php | 23 | Laravel, plain PHP, WordPress nonces |
| Ruby Rails & Sinatra controllers to services and models | .rb | 20 | Rails, Sinatra |
| Rust Axum, Actix & Rocket handlers, format! traced per argument | .rs | 26 | Axum, Actix, Rocket, Warp |
| C / C++ argv, stdin, sockets & getenv into exec, printf formats, SQL and files | .c .cpp .cc .h .hpp | 16 | POSIX, Win32, C++ STL streams |
Status definitions
- Implemented — the language engine reports the rule (it is in the engine's registry, which is checked at compile time).
- Measured — the language also has a public labelled corpus in the benchmark report, with per-category results.
- Not covered — the engine does not report the rule; line-level detectors may still flag simple cases.
Measured languages: Go, PHP, Ruby, Rust, Java, Python, C#, C, C++, TypeScript. Kotlin has no public labelled corpus and is tested with unit tests and deliberately vulnerable apps.
Known limitations
- TypeScript: Dynamic property access with computed keys is followed only for literal keys.
- TypeScript: Framework middleware defined in another package is not inspected.
- Python: Values that pass through dynamically imported modules (importlib) are not followed.
- Java: An algorithm or setting read from a .properties file is not resolved (BenchmarkJava hash cases).
- Java: Values built by a factory in another file are followed only through its return value, not its internal state.
- Kotlin: There is no public labelled Kotlin corpus, so Kotlin results are not in the benchmark report; the engine is tested with unit tests and the AndroGoat / Goatlin apps.
- Go: Code-injection and authentication-failure categories score low on the sast-benchmark corpus.
- C#: A value returned by a method in another file is not yet used to prove a sink safe (Juliet flow variant 61), which leaves some SQL false positives.
- PHP: XXE detection follows libxml's real defaults, so many corpus cases labelled vulnerable are not flagged.
- PHP: CSRF is reported only for session- or cookie-authenticated handlers.
- Ruby: XXE: we follow Nokogiri's real defaults (external entities off), which disagrees with the corpus labels.
- Ruby: Authorization-failure and CSRF categories are not detected yet.
- Rust: Calls to a project's own stub HTTP clients or deserializers are not treated as sinks; only real library calls are.
- C/C++: Macros defined in headers that are not in the scan are not expanded.
- C/C++: rand() is not treated as attacker input, so Juliet's rand-sourced cases are not flagged.
Next: Vulnerability coverage →