Trust Center

What happens to your code when you connect it

A code-security product should be judged by its own security posture. This page describes what TrustLedger accesses, what it stores, how long it keeps it and how it is protected — and, just as plainly, what we have not done yet.

What we access

The metadata of pull requests in repositories you connect, and the contents of the files each pull request changes. Read-only: the app cannot push, merge or change settings.

What we store

Scan results (findings, traces, risk scores, AI estimates), the content of scanned files — so reviewers can see the flagged lines — attestations and an audit log. Scoped to your organisation.

What we never do

Execute your code, use it to train AI models, share it with other customers, or ask for write access to your repositories' contents.

Architecture and data flow

Dashed outlines are trust boundaries. Code crosses from your git provider into TrustLedger only when a pull request in a connected repository changes, and only the changed files.
TrustLedger architecture and data flowA pull request on GitHub triggers a signed webhook to the TrustLedger application on Vercel, which queues a scan job. The scan worker fetches the changed files with a short-lived installation token, analyses them as text, stores results in an organisation-scoped Postgres database, and posts a check run back to GitHub. Users read results in the dashboard.YOUR GIT PROVIDERTRUSTLEDGER (VERCEL · SUPABASE · UPSTASH)Pull requestopened or updatedon GitHub / GitLab / BitbucketCheck run / statuspass, or merge blockeduntil a reviewer attestsWebhook endpointHMAC-SHA256 signatureverified before anything runsJob queue (QStash)the scan is queued, not runinside the webhook requestScan workerfetches changed files (GitHub: short-livedinstallation token) · parses them as text,never executes them · size and depth limitsPostgres (Supabase)row-level security per organisationfindings, risk, file content for reviewhash-chained audit logDashboard & APISupabase Auth · SSO · 2FA · SCIMrole checked on every writeEd25519-signed exportssigned webhookenqueuedeliver jobfetch changed files (read-only)store resultspost check run / statusorg-scoped reads

Repository permissions, and why each is needed

These are the exact permissions the TrustLedger GitHub App requests. It subscribes to these events: pull_requestpushcheck_runcheck_suite. GitLab and Bitbucket connections need read access to merge/pull requests and repository content, and permission to post a commit/build status.
PermissionAccessWhy
Pull requestsReadTo learn which files a pull request changes and to read its metadata (title, branch, author, commit).
ContentsReadTo fetch the contents of the changed files so the scanner can analyse them. No write access to your code.
MetadataReadRequired by GitHub for every app: repository names and visibility.
ChecksWriteTo post the scan result as a check run on the pull request, which is what can hold a merge.
Commit statusesWriteRequested by the app manifest so a result can also be reported as a commit status. On GitHub, TrustLedger currently reports through check runs only.

Source code, retention and deletion

How code is processed

Changed files are fetched when a pull request is opened or updated and analysed by the scanner as text. It never runs, builds or installs your code, and it has hard limits on file size and parse depth so a hostile file cannot exhaust it. Processing happens in TrustLedger's hosted infrastructure; we do not currently offer an on-premises scanner.

What is retained

Scan results and the content of each scanned file are stored so reviewers can see the flagged lines when they attest. By default nothing is deleted automatically: an organisation chooses a retention window between 30 days and 7 years in Settings. Automatic enforcement never deletes attested scans (they are the audit evidence), open items, or the audit log.

Deletion

Administrators can delete historical, unattested scans older than seven days, export the organisation's data, or delete the organisation's account and data from Settings. Attestations are immutable by database rule. Some records may be kept where the law requires it.

AI and model training

Your source code is used only to provide the service to your organisation. It is not used to train our models or third-party models, and it is not sent to external AI services for analysis — the engines run inside TrustLedger.

How data is protected

Encryption

HTTPS with HSTS everywhere. Data at rest is encrypted by the database provider. Two-factor secrets are additionally encrypted with AES-256-GCM, and backup codes are stored only as salted hashes.

Secrets and credentials

GitHub access uses short-lived app installation tokens requested when needed, not stored personal tokens. Incoming webhooks are rejected unless their HMAC-SHA256 signature verifies. Service credentials are held as environment secrets in the hosting provider, never in the repository.

Tenant isolation

Every organisation's rows are separated by Postgres row-level security. An automated test (built on scripts/tenantScopeAudit.cjs) fails when a server-side query on customer data is not limited to one organisation.

Access control

Role-based permissions checked on every API write; SAML single sign-on, two-factor authentication and SCIM deprovisioning; per-IP rate limits on every API route.

Audit log

Sign-ins, repository changes, exports, attestations and administrative actions are written to a hash-chained log: each entry commits to the one before it, so a removed or edited entry breaks verification.

Attestation integrity

An attestation records the reviewer, a timestamp and a payload hash, and is bound to the file's content hash: it carries over only to scans of byte-identical content. Trust Records and audit exports are signed with Ed25519; the public key is published at /.well-known/trustledger-export-signing-key and scripts/verify-trust-record.mjs verifies a document offline.

Threat model (summary)

The threats we design against first, and the control that addresses each. This is a summary, not an exhaustive model.
ThreatControl
One customer reads another customer's code or findingsRow-level security on customer tables, and a test that fails when a server-side query on an organisation's data is not limited to one organisation.
A forged webhook triggers scans or writes resultsHMAC-SHA256 signature verification with the per-app webhook secret before any processing.
A malicious file attacks the scannerCode is parsed, never executed; file-size and nesting-depth limits; the analysis engines work only on the text they are given and make no network or filesystem calls.
A stolen session or API key is used2FA and SSO, API keys with expiry and revocation, per-IP rate limits, every sensitive action in the hash-chained audit log.
Someone rewrites the audit record of who approved whatImmutable attestations, hash-chained audit log, Ed25519-signed exports verifiable offline.
An approval is reused for code that later changedAttestations are bound to the file's content hash; changed content needs a new attestation.

Subprocessors

ProviderPurposeData
VercelApplication hosting and serverless functionsAll application traffic, transiently
SupabasePostgres database, authentication, file storageAccount data, scan results, scanned file content, audit log
UpstashJob queue (QStash) and Redis cache / rate limitingScan job references, rate-limit counters
GitHub, GitLab, BitbucketSource hosting integrationsOnly repositories you connect
SentryError monitoringError reports and stack traces
PostHogProduct analytics, where enabledUsage events
SendGridAccount and alert emailRecipient address and message
Payment processorBilling, paid plans onlyBilling contact and payment details

Integrations you configure yourself (Slack, Jira, PagerDuty, webhooks) receive the alerts you route to them.

Vulnerability disclosure and incident response

Report a vulnerability

Email trustledgerapp.dev@gmail.com. We acknowledge within 3 business days and give an initial assessment within 10. Good-faith research within our guidelines is covered by safe harbour. Full policy: /security · machine-readable: security.txt.

If something goes wrong

Incidents are triaged by severity with a written runbook. If we confirm an incident affecting a customer's data we notify that customer's administrators without undue delay and within 72 hours of confirming it, with what happened, what data was involved and what to do.

Compliance status

  • SOC 2: not certified. TrustLedger helps you produce SOC 2 evidence for your own change-management controls; we have not completed a SOC 2 audit of our own.
  • ISO 27001: not certified.
  • Independent penetration test: not yet performed. We will publish a summary when one is.
  • GDPR: data export and deletion are available to administrators; see the privacy policy.

We will update this section when any of these change, and never list a certification we do not hold.